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The Anatomy of a Mosk Opinion
By ERIC GOLDMAN*
Introduction
The purpose of this Article is to distill a conceptual working model
of the archetypal Mosk opinion. This examination into Justice Mosk's
work is structural in method. The Article develops an underlying struc-
ture of interrelated functions that generate diverse Mosk opinions, even
though no individual opinion expressly follows the subtextural generat-
ing process.1 I do not contend that Justice Mosk follows the model con-
sciously or consistently; rather, the model conceptualizes his
fundamental approach to legal problems, and may be of some assistance
to those judges and lawyers who, like myself, have been surprised and
persuaded over the years by the procession of insightful Mosk opinions
and would like to achieve a measure of his analytic prowess. My thesis is
that many Mosk decisions, regardless of area of law, derive from a dis-
tinctive analytical approach that programs original contextual interpreta-
tion and application into each decision.
In his twenty years on the California Supreme Court, Justice Mosk
has authored more than 500 majority opinions. A reading of these opin-
ions together-like a collection of short stories by a master-reveals sim-
ilarities of form and method that are not apparent from a reading of an
individual opinion with attention focused on the resolution of the partic-
ular controversy before the court. Reading "The Collected Works of
Mosk, J." opens one's eyes to the artificiality of the categories of law
under which legal publishers and law professors routinely file precedent.
The opinions reveal a basic continuity of style, perception, and method
from case to case, regardless of legal category.
In literary criticism, the concept of "le mot juste" signifies the
unique word or grouping of words that conveys the most precise expres-
sion of a thought. To convey an idea of the judicial art of Justice Mosk, I
* B.A., 1970, Reed College; J.D., 1980, University of California, Davis. Assistant Pro-
fessor, Whittier College School of Law. The author served as an extern to Justice Mosk in the
fall of 1979. He wishes to thank Catherine Goldman, Gene Girard and Professors Tom Dia-
mond and Ellis Prince for their input on the subject of jurisprudence.
1. This explanation of structural analysis appears in Heller, Structuralism and Critique,
36 STAN. L. Rnv. 127, 129 (1984).
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suggest the term "la balance juste" to signify the true balance between a
legal rule and the legitimate interests of the parties subjected to its appli-
cation in a fact-pattern that the rule-makers did not expressly anticipate.
Many legal opinions reflect the product of legal programming that
inputs round, unique facts and outputs square, legal pigeonholes. "La
balance juste," on the other hand, requires a custom-made refinement of
the law to fit a specific, real situation. It requires an intelligent determi-
nation of how conflicting legal principles should meaningfully interact in
the actual ecosystem that contains the dispute before the court. Because
"la balance juste" is custom-made for the individual case, it represents an
outcome that is both legally precise and intuitively fair.
An abstract description of Mosk's method for achieving "la balance
juste" appears at first glance indistinguishable from any conventional ap-
proach to legal analysis. Indeed, one hallmark of a Mosk opinion is the
craft of making the unanticipated result appear inevitable. For these rea-
sons, this Article compares Mosk's analytical method with a conven-
tional mode of legal analysis.
Many appellate judges and law students outside of jurisprudence
class still utilize the modified Aristotelian syllogism represented by the
mnemonic IRAC:
Issue: A statement of the question presented by the case.
Rule: A brief statement of the rule of law that governs the issue,
phrased in terms of the legal effect of certain operative facts.2
Application: An analysis of whether the operative facts that pro-
duce the specified legal result are present in the case. Explicit pol-
icy arguments or implicit judicial bias may determine whether facts
are recognized as "operative facts."
Conclusion: A statement of the legal result. If the operative facts
are present, the specified legal result follows.
Justice Mosk's analytical approach also involves formulating issues,
establishing controlling rules and applying the law to the facts; Mosk,
however, interrelates these functions in a subtly different process that
often produces results markedly different than those which are produced
by the standard IRAC formula. Mosk's method of analysis is as follows:
Preliminary question: What is the issue within the meaning of the
rule of law that controls the case?
Purpose of the rule: An original analysis of the legal principle ex-
pressed by the governing rule.
2. As Professor Corbin put it, "[w]hen a rule of law has been reduced to words it is a
statement of the legal effect of operative facts; i.e., it is a statement that certain facts will
normally be followed by certain immediate or remote consequences in the form of action or
non-action by the judicial and executive agents of society." Corbin, LegalAnalysis and Termi-
nology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 164 (1919).
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Issue: The legal question in the case stated in terms of the essential
purpose of the governing rule as it relates to the fact pattern of the
case.
Application: An analysis of the issue in the context of the ecosys-
tem in which the case arises; how the legal principle should func-
tion in the actual circumstances of the case to best achieve its
purposes.
Conclusion (la balance juste): A description of the properly func-
tioning system in light of the controlling principles and the real-life
situation before the court.
I do not maintain that each step in Mosk's analysis is unique and
that no other judge subjects legal issues to similar analyses. I do contend,
however, that Mosk's methodology, as described herein, attempts to find
a true synthesis for each case between legal principles and reality, and
that this willingness to hone previous codifications of principles to fit the
particular case before the court keeps Mosk at the cutting edge of the
law. Of course, there is a danger of overstating any single thesis that
purports to embody the judicial method reflected in twenty years of legal
opinions. I do not pretend to account for every individual decision, nor
claim that the typical Mosk opinion routinely follows the five analytical
steps set forth here. Instead, this Article attempts to elucidate Mosk's
creative process by modeling the structure of an archetypal Mosk
opinion.
I have chosen several cases to illustrate Mosk's conceptual method
of analysis. They are not necessarily landmark cases, although some are.
These cases traverse different areas of the law and have little, if any, sub-
stantive connection. But these cases share with each other and with
many Mosk opinions a common analytic methodology. When one exam-
ines the opinions of Justice Mosk, it is this methodology, rather than any
particular judicial predisposition, that best accounts for the results
reached in individual cases.
I. Issues and Rules
A conventional legal opinion begins with a statement of the issue,
which favors one party or the other, and proceeds to a statement of the
legal rule that governs the legal question. Mosk, however, begins his
analysis by asking what the issue should be in light of the purposes of the
legal rule. His first step is thus to determine what the rule was intended
to accomplish. Mosk's premise is that one must first understand the in-
tended function of the rule in the rule's original context before one can
properly state the legal issue in the case.
Spring 19851
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Mosk's approach to formulating the issue in a case can be further
broken down into several distinct analytical steps. First, Mosk investi-
gates the inception of the rule in the context of the specific problem to
which the rule was addressed. If the rule is precedential, this is accom-
plished by a conceptual re-enactment of the precedent case to determine
the actual concerns of the precedent court. Next, Mosk distinguishes the
formative intent of the rulemaking body from the particular language it
employed in stating the rule in the original factual context. He then tran-
scribes the formative intent of the rule-its functioning purpose-to the
new fact pattern in the case before the court. Finally, Mosk formulates
the issue in the case in terms of the formative principles of the rule.
For example, in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital,3 Mosk was
faced with the question of how or whether to apply the rule of Dillon v.
Legg.' The Dillon Court had permitted the plaintiff to recover damages
for the emotional trauma caused by witnessing her child's death under
the wheels of defendant's negligently driven automobile.' Relying on the
Dillon precedent, the plaintiff in Molien sought damages for the emo-
tional distress and loss of consortium caused by the negligent misdiagno-
sis of his wife's ailment as syphilis.' The defendant, of course, sought to
limit the application of the Dillon precedent to the original fact pattern.
It is not unusual for the attorneys in a case to advance differing
characterizations of the facts; the litigator's skill lies in fitting the facts
into the camp of the favoring precedent. The adversaries may thus create
a dilemma for the nonideological judge: which of two equally plausible
characterizations should he accept?
In Molien, Mosk handled this dilemma by obliterating it. Instead of
determining whether Molien could be pigeonholed into Dillon, Mosk an-
alyzed Dillon by re-enacting it in light of the larger perspective provided
by the addition of the Molien fact pattern. Mosk scrutinized the court's
opinion, focusing not on the stated legal consequences of the Dillon facts,
but on the underlying concerns that shaped the court's conclusion.7 He
used the additional perspective of Molien to liberate the formative princi-
ple of the Dillon precedent from its historical roots.'
In his re-evaluation of Dillon, Mosk distinguished the court's fact-
specific holding from the operative principle which produced that hold-
ing: that a defendant's liability for negligence is limited to the reasonably
3. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
4. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
5. Id. at 747-48, 441 P.2d at 925-26, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85.
6. 27 Cal. 3d at 919-21, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
7. Id. at 921-23, 616 P.2d at 815-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833-35.
8. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
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foreseeable consequences of his actions.9 Thus, for Mosk, the ultimate
issue in Molien was the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff resulting
from the negligent misdiagnosis of his wife's condition. 10
Mosk's methodology can be highlighted by a comparison with a hy-
pothetical judge's "conventional" treatment of the Dillon precedent. The
Dillon court established a rule that permits a nonvictim plaintiff to re-
cover emotional distress damages only when the plaintiff was a percipient
witness to an injury inflicted on a close relative. In conventional nomen-
clature, the Dillon court's guidelines would be given definitional status as
operative facts, the existence of which trigger the legal consequence of
liability. Whenever the operative facts were not present-as in Molien,
where the plaintiff was not a percipient witness to the negligent act per-
formed on his wife-the conventional court would not impose liability on
the defendant for the plaintiff's emotional distress. The analysis would
proceed as follows:
Issue: May a nonwitnessing plaintiff recover for negligent infliction
of emotional distress?
Rule: Dillon v. Legg limits the class of plaintiffs who may recover
for negligent infliction of emotional distress to closely related per-
sons located near the scene of a wrongful act who suffer emotional
distress as a result of witnessing the act.
Application: Plaintiff does not meet the requirements established
by the court in Dillon v. Legg.
Conclusion: Plaintiff is barred from recovery under Dillon v. Legg.
In his analysis, however, Justice Mosk was concerned primarily
with distinguishing fact from principle within the precedent. Rather than
mechanically applying the rule of Dillon to a different fact pattern, he
applied the operative principle of Dillon. His analysis proceeded as
follows:
Preliminary question: What is the proper issue within the meaning
of the Dillon v. Legg precedent?
Purpose of rule: The purpose of the Dillon rule was to limit a de-
fendant's liability for a plaintiff's injuries to those harms that were
a reasonably foreseeable risk of the defendant's negligence.
Mosk Issue: Are plaintiff's injuries a foreseeable result of the negli-
gent misdiagnosis of his wife's ailment?
As Molien illustrates, Mosk is abstract in his treatment of precedent
and fact-specific in his treatment of the case before the court. He cuts
through the factual trappings in which an issue happened to be'clothed in
the precedent case and extracts the principle on which the case was de-
cided. He formulates the issue in the case before the court by adapting
9. Id.
10. Id.
Springz 19851
448 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 12:443
his distilled principle to fit the new fact pattern. For Mosk, there is no
definitive codification of the law which can be applied mechanically from
case to case; there is instead an ongoing process of redefinition.
Mosk is a writer's judge. It is clear from reading his opinions that
he composes each decision to articulate his precise thoughts on the indi-
vidual case with care for the literary quality of his work. This reflective
concern with language is integral to Mosk's analytical processes. The
writer edits his work by asking, "What am I really trying to say here?
How can I express this thought more clearly?" Mosk edits legal rules the
same way; he asks, "What was the court or legislature attempting to say
here? How can I express the law so that its meaning is clear in the pres-
ent case?"
Mosk's flexibility with legal thought and language should not be
confused with the misconception of an "activist" judge who manipulates
a case according to a static ideological bias to the political left or right.
All judges are "active" whether they act like it or not. The simple
fact of the matter is that individual cases do require value judgments.
The idealized picture of the perfectly neutral judge who applies neutral
logic to produce correct legal conclusions is not part of the human condi-
tion, let alone the legal system. The conclusion of neutral reasoning is
prefigured by the starting assumptions to which the neutral logic is ap-
plied. In a legal decision, the definition of the issue often resolves the
ideological conflict and determines the outcome purportedly required by
subsequent neutral reasoning. The best a "neutral" judge can do is to
discuss openly and analyze the underlying and determining "pre-issues":
what should be the controlling principle in the case and how should the
issue be stated to reflect that value judgment? After a case is decided,
one can say that the case stands for a particular narrow rule, but often
the specific statement of the rule for this particular situation did not exist
before the case was decided on the basis of the applicable legal
principles.'1
Most courts apply some form of policy analysis to a controversy and
lawyers are facile in manufacturing after-the-fact policy justifications for
their clients' actions. Such rationales may range from purportedly self-
evident legal assumptions to diverse social, political, and economic ideol-
ogies. Outside of the constitutional areas, Justice Mosk does not carry
general policies from case to case. Instead, he freshly explores the spe-
cific policy underlying the governing rule in the particular case before the
court.
11. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 28-31 (1977).
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Jusice Mosk's opinion in Royal Globe Insurance Company v. Supe-
rior Court" is an illustration. The plaintiff argued that as a matter of
general policy, the legal system should permit an individual who is in-
jured by the alleged negligence of an insured to bring a direct action
against the negligent party's insurer for failing to settle the claim in good
faith. 3 The result of the case did not turn on this policy question, how-
ever. Indeed, three years before Royal Globe, a unanimous court, includ-
ing Justice Mosk, ruled that the insurer's common law duty to settle in
good faith did not run to the third party claimant.14 Mosk's analysis in
Royal Globe, however, concluded that the insurer's statutory duty under
the Insurance Code to settle claims reasonably was directly enforceable
by the third party claimant. The difference to Mosk was the purpose of
the statute. Whereas the implied duty of an insurance company to settle
in good faith is to protect the contractual rights of the insured and does
not protect a third party claimant, 5 the purpose of the statutory duty to
settle in good faith is to regulate trade practices in the insurance indus-
try. 6 The Insurance Code did this by defining unfair and deceptive prac-
tices of an insurer against both insureds and claimants. 7 Therefore, the
claimant may sue the insurer directly-not for a breach of duty to the
insured-but for a breach of the statutory duties which the insurer owes
to the claimant.' 8 The claimant's direct action is consistent with the stat-
ute's broad remedial purpose of regulating the claims practices of insur-
ance companies, in part, because the statutory scheme would not
12. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
13. Id. at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845. See also Murphy v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 943-44, 553 P.2d 584, 587-89, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424, 427-29 (1976). An
insurer's good faith duty to settle an appropriate case is implied by law into every insurance
contract even if one is not imposed by the express terms of the policy. Comunale v. Traders &
Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958). The courts impose this duty to
protect the insured from exposure to liability in excess of coverage as a result of the insurer's
gamble---on which only the insured might lose. Shapero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d
433, 92 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1971). When the insurer breaches its duty to settle, the insured may
recover from the insurer the excess of the judgment over the policy limits plus punitive dam-
ages. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711
(1974).
14. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d at 943-44, 553 P.2d at 587-89, 132 Cal. Rptr.
at 427-29. Prior to Royal Globe, however, the injured third party claimant could not sue the
defendant's insurer directly for a breach of the insurer's duty to insure, since the injured third
party claimant was not a contracting party nor a third party beneficiary. An insured could
assign his contractual cause of action to the successful plaintiff, but the personal tort cause of
action, with its emotional distress and punitive damages, was not assignable. People v. Supe-
rior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283, 287, 507 P.2d 1400, 1403, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192, 195 (1973).
15. Id. at 889-90, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
16. Id. at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
17. Id. at 888, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
18. Id. at 890, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
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function if insurers had enforceable duties to insureds only.19 Mosk's an-
alytical limitation of the policy considerations to the specific statute at
issue in the individual case thus freed a divided court to authorize a new
direct cause of action for breach of the statutory duty to settle in good
faith just three years after the same court had unanimously rejected a
direct cause of action for breach of the common law duty to settle in
good faith.20
Mosk's contextual derivation of meaning is evident especially in ad-
minstrative law cases, where the ultimate question is often the "reasona-
bleness" of an agency's action. The issue of whether an administrative
agency acted "reasonably" is inherently nebulous. The imprecise phras-
ing of the issue tends to favor the governmental agency, and to set judges
free to apply their own interpretions of the reasonableness standard.
Mosk, however, phrases the issue within the meaning of the relevant en-
abling legislation; the propriety of the agency's action becomes a question
of whether the agency's action reasonably furthered the purposes of its
enabling statute.
For example, in Green v. Obledo,21 a group of working welfare par-
ents challenged a California Health and Welfare Agency regulation that
limited the amount of work-related transportation expenses deductible
from the earnings of working welfare mothers to fifteen cents per mile
traveled.2" The welfare mothers alleged that the actual costs of owning
and operating the automobiles they needed to commute to work far ex-
ceeded the Agency's limit and should have been fully deductible.23 The
controlling statute required the Agency, when determining a claimant's
income for computing the size of the welfare allocation, to take in consid-
eration any "expenses reasonably attributable to the earning" of
income.24
In considering the welfare mothers' claims, a judge applying the
traditional IRAC analysis might proceed as follows:
Issue: Did the Agency abuse its discretion in determining that fif-
teen cents per mile was the amount of automotive expenses allowa-
ble as a deduction?
Rule: The Agency must take into account all expenses reasonably
attributable to the earning of income in determining the amount of
deductions allowable.
19. See id. at 888-90, 592 P.2d at 334-35, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48.
20. See supra notes 13-14.
21. 29 Cal. 3d 126, 624 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1981).
22. Id. at 132, 624 P.2d at 259, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
23. Id.
24. Social Security Act, § 402(a)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1973) (amended 1981).
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Application: The Agency took these expenses into consideration
and determined that fifteen cents per mile was the reasonable
amount of expenses attributable to commuting to and from work
by automobile.
Conclusion: While experts might disagree as to the fifteen cents per
mile figure, it is difficult for a court to say that it is unreasonable as
a matter of law; the Agency did not, therefore, abuse its discretion.
Justice Mosk, however, derived the issue from the statutory
purposes:
Preliminary question: What are the expenses reasonably attributa-
ble to the earning of income that should be deductible within the
meaning of the Social Security Act?
Purpose of the rule: The rule was intended to remove the disincen-
tive to holding a job represented by the cost of commuting to
work.2"
Mosk issue: Does the Agency's absolute cap of fifteen cents per
mile achieve the statutory purpose of removing the transportation
cost disincentive to holding a job?2 6
Mosk's phrasing of the issue in Green in terms of the statutory man-
date was more than a matter of semantics; it afforded a substantive stan-
dard for the court's analysis of the reasonableness of the Agency's
actions. To the extent that it disallowed the deduction of transportation
expenses in excess of fifteen cents per mile, the Agency's regulation failed
to eliminate the disincentive to which the controlling statute was ad-
dressed.27 The simple technique of phrasing the reasonableness issue in
terms of the statutory purpose revealed the incongruity between the
Agency's authority and its actions. It also transformed the usually inef-
fectual reasonableness standard.into a meaningful instrument to ensure
governmental accountability.
Mosk's methodology sometimes produces results different than that
indicated by an apparent "plain meaning" conventional analysis of the
controlling rule. Mosk is less concerned with the meaning of the words
of a rule, considered in isolation, than with the intended meaning of
those words in the rule's original context.
For example, the language of the statute at issue in Clean Air Con-
stituency v. California State Air Resources Board2" authorized the Board
to implement a pollution control program for automobiles29 and permit-
ted the agency to delay its program only for "extraordinary and compel-
25. Green, 29 Cal. 3d at 135, 624 P.2d at 260, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 139, 624 P.2d at 263, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
28. 11 Cal. 3d 801, 523 P.2d 617, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1974).
29. CAL. HEALTI & SAFETY CODE § 39107.6 (West 1979) (repealed by Stats. 1975).
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ling reasons."'3 ° Mosk did not, however, interpret this statute to permit
the Board to defer its pollution control program whenever something
"extraordinary and compelling" happened in the world. He instead ana-
lyzed the issue in the context of the agency's limited grant of authority to
implement pollution control. Within this context, the only "extraordi-
nary and compelling reasons" were those that justified a delay for reasons
that related to pollution control.31
Mosk thus rejected the Board's contention that the 1973-74 energy
crisis was an "extraordinary and compelling reason" to delay the Board's
program for requiring the installation of pollution control devices on
automobiles. Although the gasoline crisis was an extraordinary event
and a reason to delay installing energy-costly pollution controls, it was
not an "extraordinary and compelling reason" within the meaning of the
pollution control statute.32 A decision to postpone the pollution control
program because of the gasoline shortage was not within the Board's
statutory grant of authority to implement a pollution control program.33
II. Application of Law to Facts
Legal theory is applied at the artificial intersection of two different
dimensions: the conceptual and the material. The conceptual dimen-
sion-comprised of rules-is the abstract plane of the law.34 The mate-
rial dimension-comprised of people, things, and events-is the reality
upon which the conceptual legal systemization is imposed.
Legal rules are often expressed in terms of the legal consequences
that follow from the reported existence of certain facts deemed legally
significant. Thus, if facts "A" and "B" exist, we apply legal conclusion
"C"; the rule, "'A' + 'B' -- 'C'," is the statement of the legal effect of
operative facts "A" and "B.", 35 Because it can accommodate only "rele-
vant" operative facts, the law is an inadequate language that tends, over
time, to distort reality by recognizing only a few preordered legal
categories.
The Kafkaesque judicial process that evolved from this species of
legal analysis is a game in which the court referees the litigants' self-
30. 11 Cal. 3d at 809, 523 P.2d at 621, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
31. Id. at 813, 523 P.2d at 624, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
32. Id. at 813-16, 523 P.2d at 624-26, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 584-86.
33. Id. at 817-18, 523 P.2d at 627-28, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88.
34. The law may pretend to be a mirror that merely reflects societal norms, but it is truly
a mirror only in the sense of the mirror through which Alice stepped to enter Wonderland.
The law is really an imaginary universe that has its own physics and math, and exists only in
the shared books and consciousness of an inner elite of judges, lawyers, and professors.
35. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
serving characterizations of the case. At the end of the game, the facts
are adjudged either similar to or different from those of the proffered
precedent case. But the court reserves the ultimate discretion to "fudge"
the facts to permit an "Alice in Wonderland" statement of its ruling for
posterity.36
Justice Mosk views legal rules and their application differently. He
deals with processes, not formulas. In Mosk's jurisprudence, a legal rule
is intended to affect a process in a certain way. This intent is codified by
a legislature or court in language that reacts to and anticipates certain
specific fact patterns. In real-world cases, however, the issues seldom
come packaged in the identical fact pattern anticipated by the rulemak-
ing body. Mosk prepares a rule for applicaton in the unanticipated fact
pattern by returning the codified rule to its sources. Instead of mechani-
cally and blindly applying an immutable law to a unique situation, Mosk
applies the law with consideration for its intended effect on the process.37
In computer terminology a program that is easy to access is termed "user
friendly." In the same sense, Mosk's formulation of a legal rule is "fact
friendly;" it does not program facts in isolation from the underlying
process.
Consider, for example, the rule of California Labor Code section
1156.3, subdivision (c): Upon receipt of an employer's objection to the
conduct of an employees' representational election, the Agricultural La-
bor Relations Board [ALRB] "shall conduct a hearing to determine
whether the election shall be certified."' 38 The statutory language appears
straightforward. When the employer tenders its objection, the ALRB
must hold a hearing. The legal reflex is thus set.
There may be situations, however, in which the legal reflex should
not work. For example, a party might seek to manipulate the law by
pushing the legal reflex button in a situation where the automatic legal
result negates the statutory purpose. Can the law be protected against
this type of abuse, or is this the kind of "hard case" that "makes good
law"?
In JR. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board,3 9 the
36. See supra note 34.
37. In other disciplines, Mosk's method would be referred to as "systems analysis." The
basic tenet of this form of analysis is that one cannot meaningfully analyze the effect of a
proposed change to a link in an ecosystem from the surrounding ecosystem. For an example of
the application of such analysis in environmental law, see Goldman, Legal Adequacy of Envi-
ronmental Discussions in Environmental Impact Reports, 3 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 20-
21 (1982).
38. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1156.3(c) (West 1983).
39. 26 Cal. 3d 1, 603 P.2d 1306, 160 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1979).
ANATOMY OF A MOSK OPINION 453
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ALRB refused to hold a hearing on an employer's objections to the con-
duct of a certification election won by a particular union." The em-
ployer appealed the ALRB's certification of the union as bargaining
agent and refused to negotiate with the union on the ground that Labor
Code section 1156.3 expressly required a hearing.41 The ALRB con-
tended that summary rejection was appropriate because the allegations in
the employer's petition and supporting affidavits were facially insufficient
to justify reversing the union's victory.42
Given this fact pattern, an adherent of conventional IRAC analysis
would focus on the existence of the legally operative fact, namely, the
employer's submission of a petition objecting to the conduct of the elec-
tion. The analysis would proceed as follows:
Rule: Upon receipt of a petition objecting to the conduct of an
election, the ALRB must conduct a hearing.
Application: When the employer submitted its petition objecting to
the conduct of the election, the ALRB should have conducted a
hearing.
Conclusion: The ALRB erred in rejecting the employer's objec-
tions without affording it a hearing.
Instead of applying the mechanical IRAC formula, Mosk placed the
statutory language in the context of its statutory purpose: to protect the
employee's right to self-determination by assuring fair representation
elections.43 Before applying the legal principle to the case, he examined
the facts from a "systems"' perspective. In Norton, his inquiry into the
labor-management ecosystem underlying the dispute unearthed the fact
that the employer's objection to the election results and denial of recogni-
tion were customary means of breaking up a struggling young union too
weak to follow up its election victory with a successful strike."a Thus,
when Mosk applied the rule in these circumstances, he was understanda-
bly reluctant to conclude that the ALRB's summary dismissal of the em-
ployer's facially inadequate objection was not a reasonable exercise of the
Board's authority to implement the Labor Code.4 6
Instead he looked at the employer's denial of union recognition and
the lack of a prima facie showing in the employer's petition and asked:
How should the rule function in these circumstances to further its pur-
poses? He concluded that the ALRB should be able to dismiss summa-
40. Id. at 9-10, 603 P.2d at 1309, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
41. Id. at 10-12, 603 P.2d at 1309-10, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 713-14.
42. Id. at 10, 603 P.2d at 1309, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
43. Id. at 8, 603 P.2d at 1308, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
44. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
45. 26 Cal. 3d at 15, 603 P.2d at 1312-13, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
46. See id. at 15-18, 603 P.2d at 1312-13, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 716-19.
rily a frivolous employer objection that could not change the election
result without the delay of a full evidentiary hearing.a7 He thus pro-
tected the mandatory hearing rule from employer abuse.
In Sierra Club v. City of Hayward,48 the question before the court
was whether a city council had properly cancelled a land preservation
contract made pursuant to the California Land Conservation Act.4 9 The
Act permitted a city to extend tax benefits to rural landowners in ex-
change for long-term commitments to maintain their land as open
space.5 ° Unless the city or the landowner gave notice of an intent to
terminate the agreement, a land preservation contract would renew auto-
matically at the beginning of each year.51
The statute also permitted immediate cancellation of a contract if
the continued dedication of the land became no longer "necessary [or]
desirable for the purpose of [the Act]."'52 The city council had cancelled
a contract that it deemed no longer necessary or desirable, having found
the subject property ideally suited for development.53 The Sierra Club
disagreed with the city's finding and challenged the cancellation.54
An IRAC analysis of the cancellation issue might proceed as
follows:
Rule: A city council may cancel a land conservation agreement
when the continued dedication of the land is neither necessary nor
desirable.
Application: The city council found, and substantial evidence sup-
ports, that continued dedication of the subject land is neither nec-
essary nor desirable, and that the land is ideally suited for
suburban development.
Conclusion: The land preservation contract was cancelled
properly.
Mosk's analysis, however, began with the purpose of the Land Con-
servation Act: to preserve open space by extending tax benefits to those
who voluntarily subject their land to enforceable development restric-
tions.55 The land preservation process which the Act created could
achieve this purpose only if it operated to ensure that land preservation
47. Id. at 17, 603 P.2d at 1314, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
48. 28 Cal. 3d 840, 623 P.2d 180, 171 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1981).
49. California Land Conservation Act of 1965, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-51295 (Deer-
ing 1974).
50. Id.
51. Id. §§ 51244-51245.
52. Id. § 51280.
53. 28 Cal. 3d at 848, 854, 623 P.2d at 183, 187, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 622, 626.
54. Id. at 846-47, 623 P.2d at 182, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
55. Id. at 850-852, 623 P.2d at 184-85, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 623-25.
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contracts were in fact enforceable. 6
If cancellation were a simple matter of showing that restricted land
had become more valuable for a developed use, long-term land preserva-
tion contracts could not be enforced; 7 the Legislature's intent to guar-
antee a stable tax base in return for long-term binding commitments
could not be given effect."8 If immediate cancellation were permitted on
such a showing, a landowner could obtain a tax advantage and still de-
velop whenever development became profitable.59 Mosk thus concluded
that a mere showing that restricted land had become a logical site for
development could not sustain a finding that cancellation-as opposed to
non-renewal--of a land preservation contract was proper within the
meaning of the Act.'
The dynamic interplay in Mosk's analysis between the factual con-
text and the purpose of the legal rule is further illustrated by a series of
three prison cases that reached the court in 1979. The cases were
brought by members of a statewide prisoners', union to challenge several
prohibitions imposed by administrators of the Soledad prison. The ad-
ministrators had barred the inmates from corresponding with parolees,
from wearing Prisoner's Union lapel buttons, and from holding union
meetings with outside members and guests in attendance. The inmates
based their actions in part on California Penal Code section 2600 which
provides that a state prison inmate may be deprived of his civil rights
only to the extent necessary to safeguard the public and secure the penal
institution in which he is confined.61
In the first two cases, In re Reynolds6' and In re Brandt,63 the court
split predictably along liberal and conservative lines. Justice Mosk con-
curred in the majority's application of conventional First Amendment
analysis in both cases to strike down the prison administration's prohibi-
tions. In the third case, In re Price," the court again split along liberal
and conservative lines; this time, however, Justice Mosk authored the
majority opinion, holding that the prisoners could not conduct union
meetings in the presence of outsiders.65
56. Id. at 855, 623 P.2d at 187, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 626-27.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (West 1982).
62. 25 Cal. 3d 131, 599 P.2d 86, 157 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1979).
63. 25 Cal. 3d 136, 599 P.2d 89, 157 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1979).
64. 25 Cal. 3d 448, 600 P.2d 1330, 158 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1979).
65. Id. at 454-55, 600 P.2d at 1333, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
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Neither the dissenting nor the concurring Justices saw any differ-
ence between Price and the previous two cases. Concurring Justice Clark
opined that the Price reasoning should have applied also in Reynolds and
Brandt.66 Justice Newman's analysis in his dissent would have precluded
a ban on holding union meetings with non-inmates present, at least in the
absence of a demonstrated threat to security.67
Mosk's apparent turnaround can be explained by his contextual
analysis. For Mosk, the simple issue in Price is whether the specific in-
mate activity could be proscribed for reasons of prison safety.68 Mosk
viewed the subject activity of union meetings between inmates and guests
in Price as differing fundamentally from the non-contact correspondence
between inmates and parolees in Reynolds, or the wearing of union but-
tons in Brandt.69 He explained:
Prisons differ substantially from a free society. The melancholy
fact is that they are populated by an inordinate number of persons
who have previously resorted to violence. Any form of concerted
activity among that populace, particularly when directed to griev-
ances and complaints and encouraged by outside persons, appears
calculated to create potentially explosive situations.7 °
These realistic considerations tipped the scales in favor of upholding the
prison administration's prohibitions. The difference in the prisoners' ac-
tivity in Price thus required a different result than was reached in the
previous two cases which concerned more symbolic free speech. Mosk's
"swing vote" is inconsistent only in the political context of liberal and
conservative ideologies. His is the only position rooted in the reality of
the situation.
The importance of factual context in Mosk's analysis lends a natural
descriptive element of constantly changing variety to his decisions.
While most appellate opinions contain only some dry reference to the
facts, Mosk's opinions describe a living, vibrant world. In re Marriage of
Carney7 presented the question of whether a physical handicap creates a
reasonable presumption of parental unfitness in the context of a custody
fight. To Mosk, the issue was not an abstract question of law, but a fact-
bound question requiring an analysis of the specific parent-child relation-
ship before the court.72 His inquiry focused on whether the parental
66. Id. at 455, 600 P.2d at 1333-34, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 876-77.
67. Id. at 463464, 600 P.2d at 1338-39, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 881-82.
68. Id. at 453, 600 P.2d at 1332, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
69. Id. at 454, 600 P.2d at 1333, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
70. Id.
71. 24 Cal. 3d 725, 598 P.2d 36, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1979).
72. Id. at 736-739, 598 P.2d at 42-44, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 389-91.
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function would be unduly hindered by the particular disability involved
in the case:
[T]he essence of parenting. . . lies in the ethical, emotional and
intellectual guidance the parent gives to the child throughout his
formative years, and often beyond. . . . Even if it were true, as
the [trial] court herein asserted, that William cannot do 'anything'
for his sons except 'talk to them and teach them, be a tutor,' that
would not only be 'enough'-contrary to the court's conclusion-it
would be the most valuable service a parent can render. Yet his
capacity to do so is entirely unrelated to his physical prowess:
however limited his bodily strength may be, a handicapped parent
is a whole person to the child who needs his affection, sympathy,
and wisdom to deal with the problems of growing up. Indeed, in
such matters his handicap may well be an asset: few can pass
through the crucible of a severe physical disability without learning
enduring lessons in patience and tolerance.73
Mosk's method of contextual analysis also explains his perhaps most
controversial decision, Bakke v. Regents of the University of California.7 4
The facts in Bakke are well known and need be supplied only sketchingly
here. Mr. Bakke contended that his constitutional rights were violated
when he was denied admission to the medical school of the University of
California at Davis. The university's affirmative action program, Bakke
alleged, had resulted in the admission of a less qualified minority appli-
cant in Bakke's place.75 Justice Mosk wrote the majority opinion of the
court, which required that the medical school both admit Bakke and base
its future admissions decisions on the individual merit of each appli-
cant.76 The United States Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion by Jus-
tice Powell, affirmed in part and reversed in part, striking down the
quota-type admissions program at the medical school, but holding that a
university's admissions policy could consider race as a factor.7 7
One might reasonably agree or disagree with Mosk's opinion in
Bakke; the point here is that Mosk's abhorrence of an institutional pro-
gram of reverse discrimination in the absence of a showing of discrimina-
tion by the university was the natural consequence of his contextual
methodology. While in Mosk's view it was a proper consideration to
provide special tutoring and other support services for disadvantaged
73. Id. at 739, 598 P.2d at 44, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
74. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976).
75. Id. at 34, 553 P.2d at 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
76. Id. at 62-64, 553 P.2d at 1171-72, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
77. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In a later case,
Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 604 P.2d 1365, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1980), the
California Supreme Court explicitly approved hiring quotas based on race. Justice Mosk, how-
ever, dissented. Id. at 286, 604 P.2d at 1383, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
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students, the attractive ideal of eliminating the present effects of racial
discrimination could not justify refusing access to otherwise qualified
nonminority individuals.
Mosk's reasoning in Bakke reflects the same purity of analysis that,
for example, compelled his conclusion in Clean Air Constituency v. Cali-
fornia Air Resources Board.78 In that case, the Board was prohibited
from delaying its pollution control program for gasoline-conservation
reasons extraneous to its mandate to implement pollution controls. Simi-
larly, the Bakke decision required that the state university not be permit-
ted to reject qualified applicants for reasons unrelated to the university's
educational purposes. Mosk's methodology protected both cases from
outside influences-"good" or "bad." In short, each case was decided on
its own merits in much the same way that Mosk believes individuals
should be treated.79
III. Legal Conclusions
In any legal analysis, the application of the legal standard to the
facts yields a conclusion. The IRAC syllogism states a rule as a major
premise; thereafter, depending upon the characterization of the facts in
the minor premise, the formula spits out the conclusion. Mosk's analy-
sis, however, does not directly produce a "yes" or "no" result. Instead,
it produces a dynamic description of the proper working relationship be-
tween the parties and the law. His analysis of each controverted point
determines what is necessary for the system as a whole to function as the
law intended.
Professor Dworkin explained the distinction between the operation
of legal principles and legal rules."0 Rules are applicable in an all-or-
nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then the answer it
supplies must be accepted or the rule reversed. If two rules conflict, then
one must be given priority." On the other hand, when legal principles
conflict, one does not simply discard one and enforce the other. One re-
solves the conffict by examining the intersection of principles and taking
into account the relative weight of each in the particular circumstances.8 2
This is not to say that a judge has unbridled discretion to manipulate a
78. 11 Cal. 3d 801, 523 P.2d 617, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1974); see supra notes 28-32 and
accompanying text.
79. See, ag., People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 267, 599 P.2d 622, 626, 158 Cal. Rptr.
316, 320 (1979) (quoting Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1964) (" '[t]he public
has the right to expect its officers. . . to make adjudications on the basis of merit' ")).
80. R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 14-45.
81. Id. at 24.
82. Id. at 26.
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result by playing-off different principles, but rather that the meaningful
application of intersecting legal standards demands the use of
judgment. 3
The case of Sanchez v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,84
for example, involved an out-of-work waitress' claim for unemployment
insurance benefits. The plaintiff, Ms. Sanchez, had refused several wait-
ressing jobs requiring her to work on Saturday and Sunday, citing her
need to care for her infant son on those days. 85 Because Ms. Sanchez had
previously worked on weekends, the Employment Development Depart-
ment found that her self-imposed exclusion from weekend employment
was without good cause.86 Ms. Sanchez was deemed not "available for
work" within the meaning of the Unemployment Insurance Code, and
was denied unemployment benefits. 7
Mosk's analysis of the case proceeded as follows:
Mosk Issue 1: Does a parent have "good cause" under the Unem-
ployment Insurance Code for refusing to accept work that would
conflict with her duties to care for her minor child?88
Mosk Issue 2: What is the meaning of the Code's "availability"
requirement and is it satisfied by Ms. Sanchez's willingness to take
a waitressing job not requiring weekend work?89
Application: How should the legal principles work in the particular
circumstances?:
(1) The importance which the law places on the parent-child rela-
tionship mandates that "good cause" in the Unemployment Insur-
ance Code be defined so as not to adversely affect that
relationship.90
(2) The unemployment system would not work if the Code's
"availability" requirement could be satisfied by a mere willingness
to accept work for which there is no substantial field of potential
employers. 91
Mosk Conclusion (synthesis): "Good cause" under the Unemploy-
ment Code must "not be defined so narrowly as to compel unem-
ployed parents [like Ms. Sanchez,] who remain available to a
significant labor market, to fulfill their parental responsibilities
only upon pain of losing their unemployment benefits." 92
83. Id. at 31-39.
84. 20 Cal. 3d 55, 569 P.2d 740, 141 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1977).
85. Id. at 59, 569 P.2d at 743, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
86. Id. at 62, 569 P.2d at 745, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
87. Id. at 59, 569 P.2d at 743, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
88. Id. at 62, 569 P.2d at 745, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
89. Id. at 65-66, 569 P.2d at 746-47, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53.
90. Id. at 69-70, 569 P.2d at 749-50, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56.
91. Id. at 65, 569 P.2d at 746, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
92. Id. at 70, 72, 569 P.2d at 750, 751, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 156, 157.
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Mosk's conclusion described the interaction of competing legal prin-
ciples in a custom-made statement of the law that fit the particular cir-
cumstances of Ms. Sanchez's case. His resolution of the case struck what
I previously have called "la balance juste"-a true balance between the
legitimate interests of the individual and the functional needs of the sys-
tem. We can all imagine different plausible conclusions to the Sanchez
case that another court might have reached, but none has the resonance
of the Mosk opinion. This conclusion is the most satisfying because it
honestly identifies and confronts the conflicting legal principles at stake
and delineates the proper intersection of these principles in an intellec-
tual and practical fashion. Mosk's resolution satisfies on more than one
level. His impeccable analysis, tight and rigorous, appeals to our legal
intellect. His eloquent articulation of our legal system's humanism
strikes a responsive chord in our sense of justice. Mosk's "balance juste"
is not merely another opinion." This judge seeks a true synthesis of prin-
ciple and life.
Conclusion
The gap between what is legal and what is real is a measure of how
well our legal system is working. We live in a society permeated by law.
When it is rigid and has lost its connection to reality, the meaning of our
lives is lessened. The conscious process of making the law fit the case
and deciding each case on its individual merits, as exemplified in the
opinions of Justice Mosk, is the spirit of a secular and free society. It
embodies our belief in due process. It makes the law meaningful.
93. The combination is compelling; Sanchez was joined by a unanimous court, liberals
and conservatives.
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